This paper examines the causal e¤ects of bank size on banks' survival, asset quality, and leverage. Two forces drive these e¤ects: increasing returns to scale derived from banks'expertise; and competition. The …rst enables bigger banks to survive competition better, have higher asset-quality, and be more leveraged. It drives banks into a race for expansion. This race toughens competition between banks, which edges out small banks and may deteriorate all banks' asset quality.
Why is the banking industry dominated by a few "too big to fail" institutions? As a step towards answering the question, this paper considers the economic implications of bank size, which, unlike bank capitalization, receives little attention in the academic literature. Speci…cally, the paper examines the causal e¤ects of bank size on banks' survival in a competitive market and on their asset quality. Based on these e¤ects, the paper also considers how size a¤ects banks'choice of leverage. This paper characterizes the banking industry with two assumptions. First, banks have an advantage over the general public (households) in identifying which investment projects of entrepreneurs are pro…table. In this paper, while households have no way to evaluate projects, banks can attain expertise to evaluate and screen them. Therefore, households invest in a project only if some bank certi…es to them that it …nds this project pro…table. Second, banks can provide this certi…cation not by words of mouth, but by investing a su¢ cient quantity of their own funds in the projects. Thus, informed fundsnamely, those provided by banks -earn a higher rate of return than uninformed fundsnamely, those of households.
These two assumptions imply that the banking industry has increasing returns to scale, which is consistent with the industry's long-term trend of increasing concentration. 1 If a bank has attained a certain level of screening expertise, it can apply this expertise to the deployment of all its funds. Thus, all its funds earn the return of informed funds.
The more funds a bank has, the bigger pro…t it earns from its screening expertise, which induces the bank to attain a higher level of the expertise. Increasing returns to scale may, in general, result from any sort of expertise because the acquisition of expertise is in the nature of …xed costs. For example, learning a widely spoken language delivers bigger bene…ts than learning a narrowly spoken one; and becoming a top comedian is more pro…table where the potential audience is larger. 2 To exploit the increasing returns to scale, banks all want to expand. Then, competition becomes …ercer. The larger the quantity of informed funds banks supply, the lower the return rates these funds earn.
Consequently, banks all gain less from screening expertise and thus attain less of it.
The two forces, increasing returns to scale and competition, are in con ‡ict. Together they shape the implications of banks'sizes for their survival, asset quality, and leverage, and drive the banking industry to be dominated by a small number of highly leveraged banks.
First, a bank can survive competition only if its size is above a threshold, and this threshold is higher when bank …nance is more abundant. This result is consistent with the previously mentioned trend of increasing concentration: the pressure to survive drives banks all to expand, which raises the survival threshold, edging smaller banks out.
Second, if all banks are enlarged, but their shares of the loan market remain fairly stable, then their screening expertise declines and their asset quality falls. This is because, for a bank whose market share is not much increased, the negative e¤ects of competition dominate the positive e¤ects of increasing returns to scale. What banks sell to entrepreneurs, essentially, is certi…cation service rather than …nancing, because households have abundant funds. If a bank cannot sell the service to more entrepreneurs, the scale of its business is not enlarged and the force of increasing returns to scale not unleashed.
Third, there is a complementarity between leverage and screening expertise. On the one hand, the higher a bank's level of screening expertise, the greater its leverage. On the other hand, the greater leverage enlarges the scale of its funds more, which, due to increasing returns to scale, induces the bank to attain a higher level of screening expertise.
Hence, bigger banks have better screening expertise and are more leveraged. This result is consistent with a trend of growing leverage in the banking industry: with small banks continuously edged out, the remaining banks become bigger and bigger, and, thus, the industry-wide leverage gets higher and higher. 3 In this paper, …nancial intermediation arises naturally and coexists with direct …nance.
Screening expertise earns banks the informed funds'rate on the asset side, while they borrow from households at the uninformed funds'rate on the liability side. The di¤erence in rates is the pro…t margin of …nancial intermediation. Besides investing in banks, households invest directly in projects that receive bank funding as the bank funding certi…es their quality. In this paper, the allocation of households'funds between the intermediated and direct …nance channels is uniquely determined. The …nancial intermediation a¤ects the equilibrium outcome by expanding the pool of informed funds. 4 The paper shows that a universal increase in banks'sizes may cause their asset qualities to decline. It is thus related to the literature that explains why loose lending standards are associated with lending booms; see Rajan (1994) , Ruckers (2004) , and Dell'Ariccia and Marquez (2006) . A di¤erence is that, in the present paper, an increase in size drives a fall in quality, whereas in that literature, both are driven by some other factor, such as bank managers'career concern in Rajan (1994) , the distribution of borrowers'quality in Ruckers (2004) , or the distribution of information in Dell'Ariccia and Marquez (2006) .
In this paper, …nancial intermediation arises endogenously as banks want to enlarge their scales to exploit the increasing returns to scale. This is related to the literature that 3 See Section 5 for a detailed discussion of empirical implications and the relevant empirical studies. 4 In papers by Besanko and Kanatas (1993) and Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) , entrepreneurs (…rms) receive funds from both households and banks, as in the present paper. However, Besanko and Kanatas do not consider …nancial intermediation (i.e., banks drawing funds from households). While Holmstrom and Tirole include …nancial intermediation, they …nd that it does not a¤ect the equilibrium outcome and that the allocation of funds between it and direct …nance is indeterminate.
endogenizes …nancial intermediation with delegated monitoring and increasing returns to scale regarding the incentive costs of monitoring the bank. 5 The source of the increasing returns to scale is di¤erent: In this paper they are due to a general feature of expertise as mentioned above, while in that literature they are due to cross insurance. Moreover, direct …nance and intermediated …nance coexist in this paper, while not in that literature. This paper …nds bigger banks able to grow faster, implying a trend of increasing dominance, which is extensively examined in industrial economics; see Flaherty (1980) here engage in (di¤erentiated product) Bertrand competition with limited capacity à la Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 sets up the basic model in which banks invest only their own funds. This model is analyzed in section 2 and extended in section 3 to encompass bank leverage. Section 4 lays out empirical implications, while section 5 discusses a modeling choice. Section 6 concludes. All proofs are relegated to the appendix.
Basic Model
The economy lasts for two dates (numbered 1 and 2) with no discounting and is populated by many small households, a continuum of [0; 1] of banks, and a continuum of [0; 1]
[0; 1] entrepreneurs. Banks are in perfect competition, 6 and each serves a continuum of entrepreneurs. All agents are risk neutral and protected by limited liability. Each entrepreneur has a project, while banks and households have funds. 5 See Diamond (1984) , Gale and Hellwig (1985) , Williamson (1986a) , Krasa and Villamil (1992) , Winton (1995) , and Cantillo (2004) , among others, and see Gorton and Winton (2003) for a survey. 6 The case of oligopolistic banks will be brie ‡y discussed in section 6. Funds are invested at date 1 either in projects or in a risk-free asset for which the gross rate of return is 1. A project requires an investment of $B and may succeed, yielding $Z, or fail, yielding 0. 7 The probability of success is q for high-type projects and q < q for low types. The fraction of high types is n and that of low types is n = 1 n. We assume that
That is, a high-type project has positive social value, but a randomly selected one does not.
Each bank j 2 [0; 1] has K j units of funds, which captures the bank's size. The unit is so de…ned that out of 1 unit of funds, $1 can be invested in each of a continuum of mass 1 of projects. Without loss of generality, we assume K j is a continuous, nonincreasing function of j. In the basic model, banks are assumed to invest only their own funds, while bank borrowing will be incorporated in Section 3.
Households are small, but overall, their funds are so abundant that not all of these funds can be invested in entrepreneurs' projects. The remainder ‡ows to the risk-free asset. It follows that households are satis…ed with a gross rate of return 1.
Households know the prior distribution of the types of projects, but have no way of evaluating and screening them. However, banks can attain expertise in evaluating and screening projects. By assumption (1), only the high-type projects yield a surplus, so that the banks'screening services create a social value.
Banks' Screening Expertise
By spending C(p), a bank acquires screening expertise of accuracy p 2 [0; 1]. With the expertise of this accuracy, for each project it screens, the bank receives an independent 7 If projects yield a return of Z 0 2 (0; B) in the event of failure, then entrepreneurs can borrow up to Z 0 in a risk-free manner, which will not change the paper's results.
signal e s = g(ood) or b(ad) about the project's type according to Pr(e s = gje q = q) = 1; Pr(e s = bje q = q) = p; Pr(e s = gje q = q) = 1 p;
where e q is the true probability of success of the project. That is, high-type projects obtain a good evaluation with certainty, while low types receive a bad evaluation with probability p: 8 We call projects that obtain a good evaluation good projects and those that receive a bad evaluation bad projects.
To focus the analysis on banks, we assume that an entrepreneur does not know the type of his project before a bank evaluates it, and that he observes the result of the bank's evaluation. Households never observe this evaluation. Moreover, we assume that the screening accuracy of any bank is publicly observed, so the only information asymmetry between banks and entrepreneurs on the one hand, and households on the other, is over the evaluations of projects.
The cost function C( ) is convex over [0; 1] and satis…es C 00 ( ) > 0, C(0) = C 0 (0) = 0
9 which ensures that the cost does not grow too fast in p.
Let q g (p) denote the posterior probability of success for a good project, q b (p) the posterior probability of success for a bad project, and n g (p) the probability of obtaining a good evaluation. 10 Then, V g (p) := q g (p)Z B is the social value of a good project;
is the ex ante social surplus of a project if it is …nanced only when it obtains a good evaluation; and d(p) := q g (p)=q b (p) measures the di¤erence in quality 8 Note that C(p) is the cost of obtaining screening expertise of accuracy p, not that of evaluating a single project to this accuracy. That is, once a bank has paid C(p), it can evaluates all projects at accuracy p. Allowing the accuracy of evaluating one project to depend on the resources spent for this particular evaluation would not qualitatively change the paper's results. 9 That is,
between good and bad projects. It is straightforward to show that
These properties are all that is required for the analysis in this paper; the speci…c modeling of screening accuracy (2) is adopted for its simplicity. Let p be the critical level of accuracy at which the social surplus of a good project just reaches 0, namely, V g (p) = 0. Then, 0 < p < 1 and a good project has a positive social value if and only if p > p: 11 If the accuracy of evaluation is below p, then even projects evaluated as being good are not …nanced and screening service of this accuracy is useless. A bank, if not choosing accuracy above p; chooses p = 0. If a bank chooses so and thus to be uninformed, then it is identical to a household in making investments. We say that such a bank is edged out of the banking industry. If a bank opts to be informed by choosing some p > p, we say that this bank stays in business and survives competition. We call funds provided by informed banks informed funds and funds provided by households (and uninformed banks) uninformed funds.
As for how banks can credibly communicate their evaluations of the projects to households, we make two assumptions. This assumption means that to certify good evaluations to households, banks must "put their money where their mouth is."A contract between an entrepreneur and a bank must involve the investment of the bank's funds. Such a contract is characterized by a pair (I; F ), where I is the amount invested by the bank in the project and F is the face rate of return, or, simply, the face rate, of this investment so that I F is the amount to 11 This follows from the fact that V be repaid to the bank when the project succeeds; when it fails, by limited liability, no party gets anything.
Assumption 2: For a contract (I; F ), the amount of investment, I; is observable to households, but the face rate, F; is not.
We justify this assumption on two grounds. First, in real life, the amount of investment is usually publicized or reported in the media, but the terms of the investment, which F represents, are not. Second, even if the terms are publicized, they are not a reliable guide to the actual rate of return, because the entrepreneur could easily sign another contract with the bank (for example, for consulting services) to arrange a side payment to the bank, and it would be too costly for households to check all the contracts between the two.
Because of these two assumptions, in order to credibly certify a project's quality, the bank needs to invest enough of its own funds, as will be shown. This ties banks' certi…cation service, which is what they essentially sell to entrepreneurs, to the investment of their own funds. Then, bank size matters: the more funds a bank has, the more entrepreneurs it sells the certi…cation service to, and, thus, the more pro…ts it earns. This is how the paper endogenizes increasing returns to scale in the banking sector.
After an entrepreneur secures $I of funds from an informed bank, he goes to the market for the funds of households. Households observe I; and based on it, infer the quality of the project. Projects that receive no bank funding are of lower-than-average quality, therefore do not attract household funding; their entrepreneurs withdraw from the market.
Timing of Events and Information Structure
The timing of events at date 1 is as below.
Stage 1: For each j 2 [0; 1], bank j posts (p j ; R j ) -namely, the screening accuracy it attains and the expected rate of return it commits to charge for its funds.
Stage 2: Entrepreneurs each go to one informed bank and get their projects evaluated.
The evaluation of a project is observed by the entrepreneur and the bank, but not by households. Based on the evaluations, the entrepreneurs submit a request for the bank's funds. If the bank has attracted too many entrepreneurs and the total demand for its funds is above its funding capacity, then rationing happens and only a fraction of the entrepreneurs get their requests satis…ed. These entrepreneurs then sign a contract (I; F ) with the bank, where I is observed by households. Afterwards, entrepreneurs seek funds from households. If they manage to acquire $B altogether, they start their projects.
At date 2, the returns of the projects are realized and distributed to investors according to the contracts signed at date 1.
Size, Survival and Asset Quality
In order to …nd the subgame perfect equilibrium, we analyze the decisions in the following order. First, given (p; R) o¤ered by a bank, the entrepreneurs coming to it decides their demand for the bank's funds, contingent on the evaluations of their projects. Second, given all banks' o¤ers, fp j ; R j g j2[0;1] ; each entrepreneur decides to which bank he goes.
Third, anticipating these decisions by entrepreneurs, banks decide on (p; R):
Entrepreneurs' Decisions
No entrepreneurs would come to an uninformed bank, whose funds serve no certi…cation purposes. Consider the entrepreneurs who have come to an informed bank of size K that o¤ers (p; R), with p > p and R > 1: 12 Then, the demand for the bank's funds by those whose projects receive a good evaluation, henceforth called "good entrepreneurs", is
and the demand by bad entrepreneurs, namely those whose projects receive a bad evaluation, is 0. Consider now the aggregation of the individual demands for the bank's funds. Given an entrepreneur receives a good evaluation with probability n g (p) and the evaluations come independently, by the Law of Large Number, the total demand by one unit of entrepreneurs is n g (p)I(p; R): The bank can thus serve
units of entrepreneurs. If M > (p; R) units of entrepreneurs come to the bank, rationing 13 So the expected rate of return is q g 1=q g = 1; which satis…es households.
happens, and each entrepreneur is served with probability l = (p; R)=M: Otherwise, all the entrepreneurs are served by the bank. Hence, the probability of an entrepreneur being served is
Conditional on being served, an entrepreneur obtains the di¤erence of the social surplus of his project, S(p); minus the pro…t surrendered to the bank. This pro…t equals n g (p)I(p; R)(R 1) because the expected demand by him for the bank's funds is n g (p)I(p; R) and each pound of them earns the bank a net pro…t of R 1: With I(p; R)
given by (4) and
; the expected payo¤ of a served entrepreneur is
Now, consider entrepreneurs'decisions on which banks to borrow from, given all banks' deals, fp j ; R j g j2[0;1] : All the banks that attract entrepreneurs to come o¤er an incoming entrepreneur the same expected payo¤, b , because no entrepreneurs would go to a bank that o¤ers less if they can get b from some other banks. Therefore, if a bank o¤ering
where l is given by (6) . The allocation of entrepreneurs to banks, fM j g j2[0;1] ; and b are determined by (8) and the following market-clearing condition:
Banks'Decisions: Increasing Returns to Scale and Competition
Having examined entrepreneurs'decisions, we move on to …nd the best response of a bank
given the choices of (p; R) by all the other banks. Given there is a continuum of banks, each bank has only a negligible e¤ect on b ; so each bank takes b as given when choosing (p; R). Given b ; a bank can choose to be uninformed and thereby get 0 economic pro…t. If it chooses to be informed, it has to ensure that its o¤er, (p; R); can attract entrepreneurs,
i.e., that (p; R) b by (8) . The bank has no incentives to make (p; R) > b and induce excess demand. 14 Therefore, at the optimum, (p; R) = b ; which, together with (7), implies that after attaining accuracy p; the bank charges the following interest rate:
Neither does the bank induce under-demand. 15 It follows that if a bank of size K chooses to be informed at accuracy p, all its funds are lent out at return rate R(p; b ); and its value is
The bank's decision problem is to …nd a p 2 [0; 1] to maximize this value, taking b as given. Let (K; b ) be the optimal p and (K; b ) the optimal value of this decision problem. Then, the bank chooses to be informed only if (K; b ) 0; and if it does so, it picks
where R(p; b ) is given by (10) . Since the bank induces neither excess-demand nor underdemand, it receives the following number (units) of entrepreneurs and serves them all:
where (p; R) is given by (5).
14 Otherwise, it would increase the interest rate, R, which decreases (p; R); and lend all its funds out at this increased rate. 15 If the bank has only part of its funds earn return rate R(p; b ); it would lower the rate a little to R "; which induces over-demand, as (p; R ") > b ; so all its funds earn return rate R ":
The lemma below establishes a lower bound for the equilibrium payo¤ of entrepreneurs.
The lower bound for b exists because of competition between banks. If b were below the bound, then a particular bank would undercut all the other banks and obtain a big pro…t by providing a screening service of such accuracy p that the payo¤ to entrepreneurs, (p; R); is above b ; namely, what they can obtain elsewhere, for even R ! 1: By this lemma, any function of b ; such as (K; b ); is meaningfully de…ned only for for (1); which, therefore, is a precondition for any proposition below where b is taken as given.
Now we can explain the two forces that shape the economic implications of bank size:
increasing returns to scale and competition. Each force presents itself at both pro…t and marginal pro…t levels. These two forces, at these two levels, are formalized as follows.
Proposition 1 For (K; b ) at which 1 > (K; b ) > 0 (namely, the bank chooses to be informed),
Result (i) is concerned with increasing returns to scale at the two levels. First, at the level of bank pro…t, we have @ =@K > 0; that is, bigger banks get higher value from being informed. A bigger capacity bene…ts informed banks by raising both extensive margin and pro…t (or intensive) margin. A bank becomes informed only if doing so enables it to charge R > 1 for its funds; thus, the more funds a bank deploys, the higher pro…t it earns on becoming informed. Also, the bigger the bank, the higher the pro…t margin, because by (10), R increases with the screening accuracy, 16 which, as @ =@K > 0; increases with size.
Second, increasing returns to scale at the level of marginal pro…t drive @ =@K > 0;
that is, bigger banks choose higher screening accuracy. The choice of screening accuracy, (K; b ); which maximizes (11) , satis…es the following …rst order condition for p:
The marginal pro…t from higher accuracy, which appears on the left-hand side of the equation, is proportional to the size, K. Intuitively, screening expertise of higher accuracy enables the bank to charge a higher interest rate, which augments the bank's pro…t farther if the bank is larger.
From @ =@K > 0 it follows that the larger the bank, the bigger the marginal value of size (i.e. @ =@K), because by the envelope theorem
Result (ii) is concerned with two e¤ects of competition, where competition is represented by b ; the payo¤ a bank has to give entrepreneurs for attracting them to come.
First, at the level of pro…t, we have @ =@ b < 0; that is, …ercer competition lowers banks'
pro…t. This is because it forces banks to surrender more payo¤ to entrepreneurs and, thus, to obtain less from the certi…cation service.
Second, we have @ =@ b < 0; that is, …ercer competition drives banks to lower screening accuracy. It does so by squeezing the marginal pro…t to banks from an accuracy increment, which both widens the pro…t margin and enlarges the business scale. Screening of higher accuracy increases the social value of a project, S(p); and thereby widens the pro…t margin from each project screened, S(p) b : The total marginal pro…t so generated 16 Note that 
Result (i) says that a bank survives competition (i.e., 0) only if its size is above a threshold (i.e., K K), while smaller banks are edged out. Result (ii) says that when competition becomes …ercer (i.e., a larger b ), the threshold of survival rises. This is because the more payo¤ needed to give entrepreneurs, the less a bank gets from serving one entrepreneur on becoming informed; in order to cover the cost of attaining screening expertise, therefore, the more entrepreneurs it needs to serve, which requires a larger funding capacity.
The two results together suggest that the banking industry is subject to a trend of increasing concentration. 17 The pressure to survive and the motive to exploit the increasing returns to scale drive banks into a race for expansion, which raises b (as we 17 For supportive empirical evidence, see the empirical studies cited in footnote 1.
will show), so that all banks face even …ercer competition. Moreover, if the extent of expansion is proportion to the marginal value of size, namely to @ =@K; then result @ 2 =@K 2 > 0 (Proposition 1.i) suggests that smaller banks are able to expand less, thus losing out in the race. Altogether, smaller banks are continuously edged out, leaving the banking industry more and more concentrated.
Having examined the decisions of entrepreneurs and banks, we now proceed to de…ne the equilibrium formally and examine its existence and properties.
Equilibrium
Banks choose to be informed if the value from doing so, ; is nonnegative, which, by Proposition 2, is the case if and only if K K( b ): As we assume K j to be non-increasing in j, it follows that there is a threshold t 2 [0; 1]; such that bank j chooses to be informed if and only if j t: There are two cases for the value of t. One, t = 1; namely, all banks become informed; in this case
The other, t < 1; namely, smaller banks are edged out; in this case, K t = K( b ); because K j is assumed continuous in j: Note that in the latter case, there may be a; b 2 (0; 1) such that a < t < b and K a = K b = K; that is, the marginal banks, which are of size K; play a mixed strategy, some of them being informed, the rest uninformed.
As banks'decisions on whether to be informed are summarized by variable t and each of them takes b as given, an equilibrium is thus represented by a pair of (t; b ), de…ned as follows.
De…nition 1 A pair of (t; b ) is an equilibrium if (i) Given b ;
(ii) the market clears:
Condition (17) is derived from (9) and the fact that no banks induce excess demand or under-demand. Once (t; b ) is pinned down, the equilibrium decisions of banks and entrepreneurs follow straightforwardly. Bank j chooses to be informed if and only if j t;
informed banks choose (p; R) as given by (12) and (13); (K; b ) (given by 14) units of entrepreneurs go to an informed bank of size K and demand I(p; R) (given by 4) of its funding when their projects receive a good evaluation and demand nothing otherwise.
The equilibrium market share of bank j is thus:
Proposition 3 A unique equilibrium exists and has the following properties. For an enlarged bank, these positive e¤ects dominates the negative e¤ects if it expands 18 As will be shown in the proof of Proposition 3, @ =@K > 0; that is, (K j ; b ) is non-increasing with j: Thus as a function of j, (K j ; b ) is integrable.
far more than all the other expanding banks, in which case its expansion not only weakens the competitors, but also strengthens itself. Therefore, not only do banks want to expand, but also they want to expand far more than all the others.
Result (ii) gives one condition under which this race for expansion weakens all the banks: it adds no market share to any bank. For an intuition, note that expansion always toughens competition, which tends to decrease the pro…t margin of providing certi…cation service for all banks. If this decrease in pro…t margin is not compensated by an increase in business scale -namely, if banks cannot sell certi…cation service to more entrepreneurs -banks gain less from screening expertise, and therefore attain the less of it.
With all banks'screening expertise weakened, the default risks of their assets rise.
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Note that banks still invest only in projects evaluated as good, but with the evaluations becoming less accurate, the composition of these projects gets worse: a smaller fraction of them are high types, a bigger one low types.
Welfare Properties of the Equilibrium
The equilibrium is ex post e¢ cient, because all the good projects are …nanced and none of the bad ones is. As for ex ante e¢ ciency, we de…ne the …rst-best allocation as the choice of the social planner if she can allocate entrepreneurs to banks and pick a level of accuracy for each bank, and the second-best allocation as the planner's choice if she has to respect the equilibrium market shares of banks, but picks screening accuracy for each informed bank. The …rst best allocation is more e¢ cient than the second best one, which, we show below, is more e¢ cient than the equilibrium allocation.
Suppose the planner chooses accuracy p for bank j. Then the bank's service generates a social value of S(p) from each of the b j units of entrepreneurs whom it serves in equi- 19 Mathematically, the default probability of the projects bank j invests is 1 q g (p j ), which increases
librium. Overall, thus, the bank generates a social value of b j S(p); while the social cost of attaining the accuracy is C(p): The social planner's problem for bank j is therefore:
The second-best choice of quality, denoted by p j ; satis…es the following …rst order condition:
Proposition 4 For any informed bank j; b p j > p j : That is, compared to the second-best allocation, banks overspend on screening expertise.
For an intuition, refer back to the discussion of why @ =@ b < 0 (see Proposition 1.ii).
There we show that for a bank, higher screening quality generates two bene…ts, one from more entrepreneurs to be served, the other from a widened pro…t margin S(p) b : As
; the latter bene…t accrues equally to the social planner. However, the former bene…t does not accrue to the social planner because the planner takes as given the number of entrepreneurs allocated to each bank. It is the motive of attracting more entrepreneur with higher screening quality that drives banks to overspend on screening expertise.
Essential to the proposition is the model's feature that banks'funds serve mainly certi…cation purposes and the investments of the projects are mainly …nanced by households.
Should the household sector be absent, an entrepreneur's demand for the bank's funds would be …xed at B; the investment need. The bank would serve K=B units of entrepreneurs, independent of its screening quality. Improved screening quality would not bring more entrepreneurs to the bank, therefore, the overspending result would not arise.
For an implication of this result, consider where the resources are spent to attain or improve screening expertise. A fraction of the resources might be spent on IT infrastructure. But for the banking sector, probably a bigger fraction is spent in attracting human capital with high salaries and/or bonuses. For example, over 2005-2010, the average ratio of compensation and bene…ts to overall non-interest expenses was 65% for Goldman Sachs and 64% for Morgan Stanley, 20 while, in contrast, this ratio for U.S. manufacturing sector is 11%. 21 Moreover, from an economics point of view, these payments of compensation and bene…ts may work more as a …xed cost than as a marginal cost because it seems that very often they are outlaid independently of the banks'performance rather than anchored to it. 22 If we accept that a big fraction of C(p) is thus spent, then the proposition suggests that the banking industry indeed hands out excessive payments, and a policy to cap them could improve ex ante e¢ ciency.
The next section extends the model to encompass bank leverage, whereby we show that there is a complementarity between leverage and screening quality.
Bank Leverage
In the analysis thus far, banks do not borrow from households; rather, they invest only their own funds. In this section, we assume that before banks choose screening accuracy, they can borrow funds from households, while using their own funds as the equity. 23 The investing households, as debt-holders, are repaid prior to the banks, the equity holders.
Banks' advantage over households in screening expertise drives banks to borrow. It 20 Calculated from the annual reports of the two banks published on their websites. 21 See "The misery of manufacturing," The Economist, pages 75-76, 27/09 -03/10, 2003. 22 For example, for year 2008, Citigroup and Merrill Lynch both paid their employees each a bonus of one million or more dollars, although the banks su¤ered a huge loss; see "Million-dollar bonus breakdown to reignite US bank controversy"(Financial Times, 31/07/2009). Banks often resort to the need to retain key human capital, rather than that to provide incentives, when coming to justify high bonuses. 23 The paper assumes banks do not issue outside equities to households, possibly due to some friction of costly state veri…cation in the manner of Townsend (1979) , Diamond (1984) , and Gale and Hellwig (1985) .
enables them to earn the rate of informed funds on the asset side, while they repay the rate of uninformed funds to households on the liability side, the gap between these two rates producing the pro…t margin of borrowing. Individual banks take this pro…t margin as given, and so long as it is positive, they want to borrow as much as possible. To limit their borrowing, we introduce risk-shifting problems in the manner of Jensen and Meckling (1976) . This requires the risks of the projects to be correlated, 24 while the analysis so far is independent of such correlation. To simplify the exposition, we assume that the risks of projects are perfectly correlated. Speci…cally, foreseen at date 1, at date 2 the economy is in one of three possible states, f ; 1; 2g, occurring with probability 1 q,, and q, respectively. In state , no projects succeed; in state 1, only high-type projects succeed and low types fail; and in state 2, both types succeed. So high-type projects succeed in both states 1 and 2, thus with probability q; and low types succeed in state 2 only, thus with probability q:
The Risk-Shifting Problem and Leverage Ratio
Suppose a bank borrows D units of funds from households at face rate f , so that its liability is Df . The risk-shifting problem of the bank is that if D is too large, the bank may want to invest in bad projects at a lower expected return rate but a higher face rate than it obtains by investing in good projects.
Let F be the face rate of investing in good projects, that is, F = R=q g ; and F 0 be that of investing in bad projects, which succeed with probability q b : The value of F 0 lies between F and F q g =q b . On the one hand, the bank rejects any face rate below F .
On the other hand, bad entrepreneurs cannot a¤ord a face rate above F q g =q b ; namely an expected rate of return above R, by the argument leading to (4). Then, for some 24 Otherwise, as each bank …nances a continuum of projects, the risks on its asset side will be completely diversi…ed away and no risk-shifting problems will arise.
Note that q b F 0 < q g F; but F 0 > F; that is, weighted against the risk, the investment in bad projects is worse than that in good projects, but contingent on success, the former delivers a higher return than the latter does. This hallmarks a typical circumstance liable to risk-shifting problems. To prevent them, the leverage ratio, L := D=K; should be capped, as the following lemma shows.
Lemma 2 If a bank with K units of equity funds borrows D at face rate f , attains accuracy p, and charges return rate R, then it does not invest in bad projects if and only if the leverage ratio L satis…es:
If the inequality holds, the bank repays its debt with probability q and f = 1=q:
The bank repays its debt with probability q because it does so whenever high-type projects succeed, which is in turn because the debt claims are senior to the equity claim held by the bank. The debt holders earn an expected rate of return of qf and are satis…ed with a return rate of 1. Hence (21) holds.
Complementarity between Leverage and Screening Accuracy
In this subsection we …nd the equilibrium leverage of banks and show a complementarity between leverage and screening accuracy. Banks, taking the pro…t margin of borrowing as given, want to borrow as much as they can fend o¤ the risk-shifting problems. They are thus leveraged to the upper bound given by (20) . With f given by (21) and R as a function of p given by (10) , bank j's leverage ratio, L j ; is
This equation describes how the leverage ratio of a bank depends on its screening accuracy. 25 Furthermore, leverage feeds back to screening accuracy. If bank j is leveraged at ratio L j ; then its screening accuracy is given by
That is, in determining the choice of screening accuracy, debt-…nanced funds, D = K L;
play an equal role as the equity funds, K. This is because borrowed funds and equity funds contribute in equal terms to the marginal value of higher accuracy, for which an intuition is as follows. By the preceding lemma, the probability of debt being repaid, …xed at q; is independent of the accuracy choice, p. Hence, so is the marginal cost of debt Equations (22) and (23) together yield the following.
Proposition 5 There is a complementarity between screening accuracy and leverage: for
That is, on the one hand, a bank with moreaccurate screening expertise is leveraged at a higher ratio; on the other hand, higher leverage leads to greater accuracy. 25 Or, rather the rational expectation of the accuracy, as the leverage choice is decided before the accuracy choice.
Intuitively, that L The next section presents empirical implications of the paper.
Empirical Implications
A. Bigger banks are leveraged at higher ratios: the bigger the bank, the higher the screening accuracy due to increasing returns to scale, and, by the complementarity, the higher the leverage. 26 We show in Proposition 1 @ 2 =@K 2 > 0; which suggests bigger banks able to enlarge their equity (i.e. K) farther if the extent of equity enlargement increases with the marginal value of equity, @ =@K: Together with implication A, therefore, the paper suggests that bigger banks can expand more, both by enlarging equity farther and by being leveraged higher. This suggests a trend of increasing dominance in the banking industry.
Implication A is consistent with many empirical …ndings. Liang and Rhoades (1991) , with a sample of 4751 US banking …rms over 1979-86, report on Table II that Table 3 a strong, signi…cant, and negative correlation 26 Mathematically, if (23) and @ =@K > 0; p i > p j ; and hence
between size and E/A. This strong negative correlation is also found, more recently, by induced their borrowers'stock prices to jump higher, were issued at lower interest rates, and were "less likely to be protected by a borrowing base," altogether suggesting that these banks "provide a higher level of certi…cation."(both quotations on p. 2731). Also, Hao (2003) documents, using a sample of U.S. banks over 1988-1999, an inverse link between bank size and loan yield spread, which, the author suggests, may be explained by bigger banks picking borrowers of higher credit-quality. Indirectly, Billett et al. (1995) report, using a sample of corporate loans over 1980-1989, that greater abnormal returns of the borrowers'shares are associated with loans from banks with higher credit ratings, 28 27 Mathematically, if D. An industry-wide rise in leverage tends to increase concentration in the banking industry. This is because it enlarges the capacity of all banks and thereby intensi…es competition between them, consequently edging out more small banks.
Berger, Demsetz and Strahan (1999) document that an important factor contributing to the substantial consolidation in U.S. banking industry over 1988-1997 (when the number of banks fell by 30%) was the improvement in …nancial conditions, such as low interest rates, which made it more pro…table for banks to increase leverage. Moreover, they …nd it puzzling that "M&A activity in banking appears to respond more to low interest rates ... than does M&A activity in non-…nancial industries, despite the fact that stock deals are more common than cash acquisitions in banking ..." (p. 149). This paper gives an account for this phenomenon by showing that a larger capacity delivers greater bene…ts in the …nancial sector than it does in a non-…nancial sector. In the former, we show in the discussion of Proposition 1(i) that a larger capacity bene…ts a bank in both bank loans, see, among others, Mikkelson and Partch (1986), James (1987), Lummer and McConnell (1989) , and Best and Zhang (1993). 29 Moreover, Demsetz and Strahan (1997) …nd that larger BHC take a greater proportion of commercial and industrial loans relative to securities, and Akhavein et al. (1997) …nd that after M&A, the consolidated banks shift from securities to loans. As loans demand more screening expertise than securities to invest, both papers suggest bigger banks have a higher level of screening expertise.
extensive margin and pro…t margin, whereas in the latter, it usually delivers no bene…t in pro…t margin. Lastly, Berger, Kashyap and Scalise (1995) …nd that deregulation of deposit ceiling rates contributed to the consolidation of the U.S. banking industry over 1979-1994. That is consistent with the paper's …ndings, because the deregulation allowed banks to absorb more deposits, which increased leverage.
An industry-wide rise in leverage could be induced by a regulatory loophole; for example, the o¤-balance investment vehicles to the Basel II accords. 30 The thus-created "shadow banking system"contributed substantially to the massive increase in bank leverage over the decade leading up to the 2008 crisis.
Oligopolistic Banks
In this paper, banks are modeled in perfect competition in the sense that each bank takes entrepreneurs'equilibrium payo¤, b ; as given. This approach o¤ers a simple way to disentangle the two forces that this paper identi…es as important in shaping the economic implications of bank size, namely, increasing returns to scale and competition. In many real-life economies, however, the banking industry is an oligopoly. This section brie ‡y discusses how the main results of this paper apply under such circumstances.
To simplify the exposition, consider a two-bank case, where banks 1 and 2 have funds K 1 and K 2 respectively and compete for one unit of entrepreneurs; all the other aspects are as they were modeled in section 1. Following the analysis of subsection 2.1, after banks have chosen (p j ; R j ) j=1;2 , the allocation of entrepreneurs to banks, (M 1 ; M 2 ); and 30 By Basel II, the requirement of capital bu¤er is based on the risk-weighted assets. O¤-balance investment vehicles shift the risky assets o¤ the bank's books, therefore circumvent the need to hold capital for the assets, which allows an increase in leverage.
the payo¤ of entrepreneurs, b ; are determined by the following three equations:
where
Let the solution for M j be M j (p j ; R j ; p j ; R j ) for j = 1; 2:
Now consider the decisions of the two banks. As in the case of perfect competition, it is not optimal for a bank to induce over-demand. However, unlike the previous case, a bank can now be too large, in the sense that it is optimal for it to induce under-demand.
The paper assumes this case away because it hardly captures a real-life circumstance.
Then, given the other bank's choice (p j ; R j ); bank j chooses (p j ; R j ) such that
and its best response is to be found by solving the following problem:
The best responses pin down the subgame perfect equilibrium.
In this setting of oligopolistic banks, as in that of perfect competition, there exist the forces of increasing returns to scale and competition, as formally presented in Proposition 1. Because l j = 1 for j = 1; 2; it follows from (24) that R j = R(p j ; b ); with R(p; b ) given by (10) . Thus the objective in problem (28) is the same as that in the case of perfect competition, given by (11) . Therefore, if b could be taken as a given to a bank, then Proposition 1 would hold here also. However, here b cannot be taken as given when the size of one bank is changed, because now any bank has a non-neglegible e¤ect on b . Therefore, in this setting of oligopolistic banks, the e¤ects of increasing returns to scale and those of competition cannot be disentangled. However, some results parallel to Proposition 3 can be derived, as follows.
Proposition 6 Assume the two banks are of such sizes that they both choose to be informed and not to induce under-demand. The subgame perfect equilibrium uniquely exists and has the following properties.
(i) If a bank increases its size, then the payo¤ of entrepreneurs ( b ) increases and the other bank lowers its screening accuracy and interest rate.
(ii) If both banks increase size without changing their market shares, then they both lower screening accuracy and interest rate.
The proposition can be proved in the same way in which Proposition 3 is proved.
Conclusion
In a framework where banks can attain expertise to screen projects, while the general public (namely households) cannot, this paper examines the causal e¤ects of bank size for banks'survival, asset quality and leverage. The paper …nds the following.
First, banks'screening expertise generates increasing returns to scale, which help bigger banks survive competition better, and drive banks into a race for expansion. This race intensi…es competition between banks and thereby dampens their incentives to attain or improve screen expertise. Moreover, in this race, small banks tend to lose out, subjecting the banking industry to a trend of increasing concentration.
Second, if all banks expand without much changing their market shares, then as a consequence of …ercer competition, their screening expertise all declines and asset quality all falls, in spite of the increasing returns to scale.
Third, there is a complementarity between a bank's leverage and the level of its screening expertise.
Fourth, there is a sense in which banks overspend on screening expertise. If, as seems plausible, a big fraction of this spending is used to attract human capital with high bonuses or salaries, then this overspending result suggests that the banking industry indeed hands out excessive payments.
Appendix: Proofs
For Lemma 1:
Proof. There are two cases. First, we show that if b <
S (1), a bank gets an in…nitely large pro…t, namely, (K; b ) = 1: Note …rst that
S (1); there exists some
S(p 0 ). Then, a bank can both charge R = 1; thus reaping = 1, and attract all the entrepreneurs by giving them more than b , as follows.
S(p): It increases with p;
decreases with R, and
S(p) = lim R!1 (p; R): If the bank o¤ers p = p 0 + < 1 and R = 1; the entrepreneurs coming to the bank get more than b :
S(p 0 ) = b , where the inequality applies the fact that
is increasing as noted above.
Second, we show that
Of these two terms, at p 1; the …rst one is in the order of
whereas the second one, C 0 (p); by assumption, is in the order of o( 
S (1); the value (K; b ) = 1 and the optimal choice (K; b ) =
1:
For Proposition 1:
By (11) and the envelope theorem, then, @ (K; b )=@K = R( (K; b ); b ) 1 > 0; and
it su¢ ces to show @ =@K > 0; for which denote the left-hand-side (LHS) term of (15) by Y (p; b ). Then, by the implicit function theorem,
The second order condition of the maximization problem (11) implies that (ii) By the envelope theorem
To show @ =@ b < 0; by the argument above, it su¢ ces to prove that @Y @ b < 0. For this purpose, note that
; both terms are to be shown decreasing with b : For the …rst, (d(e p) 1)S 0 (e p) > 0 and
S(1) (by Lemma 1) and thus bigger than
S(e p): For the second, d 0 (e p) > 0 and f 
Therefore, for K < "; @ (K; b )=@K = R 1 < 0: As (0; b ) = 0; we have (K; b ) < 0 if 0 < K < "; that is, a bank of size K makes loss if it chooses to invest in screening expertise and compete for entrepreneurs. Therefore, K( b ) > " > 0:
(ii) First, @ (K; b )=@Kj K=K = R 1 > 0: for banks with K = K; they get 0 value if becoming informed; and thus (R 1)K = C( (K; b )) > 0: Second, by Proposition 1(ii),
For Proposition 3:
Proof. To prove the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium, it su¢ ces to show that (16) and (17) have a unique solution of (t; b ): For this purpose, a key role is played by the following claim, which is proved after the proposition.
Claim A: The mass of entrepreneurs served by a bank of size K; (K; b ); given by (14) , satis…es: Case 1:
Then, the unique solution to the simultaneous equations of (16) and (17) is t = 1 and b = b a :
That is, not all banks become informed, namely, t < 1: Thus (16) is reduced to K t = K( b ): To this equation and equation (17) we show there is a unique solution. By Proposition 2(ii), K( b ) is a strictly increasing function. Therefore, the inverse function of K( b ) exists, denoted by (K); thus, (K) is the level of entrepreneurs' payo¤ at which banks of size K are indi¤erent between being informed and staying out.
Substitute it into (17), which then becomes:
We now prove f (t) = 1 has a unique solution t < 1 by noting or showing the following
by assumption, and
by Proposition 2(ii). And fourth, f (1) > 1: In this case, To prove that for any j = 2 ; p j and R j both fall, …rst note that as p j = (K j ; b ) and @ =@ b < 0; with b rising and K j …xed, p j falls. Second, R j as a function of p j and b ;
given by (10), increases with p j and decreases with b . Then, with p j going down and b up (as shown above), R j decreases.
(ii): To prove the result, it su¢ ces to show that if b j is given, then db p j =dK j < 0: Note that b p j satis…es the …rst order condition, (15) , with K replaced by K j ; namely,
To get b as a function of K and ; note that for any informed bank (p; R) = b , which, with (p; R) given by (7), becomes:
Solving R from (5) as a function of , and substituting it into (30), we …nd b related to
Substitute it for b into (29) , and then …nd b p j solely determined by K j through
To prove that given b j ; db p j =dK j < 0, denote the LHS of the above equation by X(p; K j ).
Then, by the implicit function theorem, For each informed bank j, as b p j decreases and also b increases (by result i), the interest rate it charges, R(b p j ; b ); decreases, as was noted above.
For Claim A, which is used for proving Proposition 3:
Proof. By (5) ; where E(K; b ) := n g (p)I(p; R); with p and R as functions of (K; b ) given respectively by (12) and (13) . To prove that @ (K; b )=@ b < 0 and @ (K; b )=@K > 0; it su¢ ces to prove that E ; while the right-hand side, namely b ; goes to
S(1);
which implies R ! 1.
For Proposition 4:
Proof. To compare p j with the equilibrium quality, b p j ; rewrite equation ( . Substitute for b from (31), then,
It follows that S(b p j ) = ( b d j b R j 1)K j = b j : Substitute it for S(p) in (32) , and b p j is then characterized by:
Now we come to compare p j with b p j : Let := Note that (q q)h g + q = q Pr(e q = qje s = g) + q(e q = qje s = g) = q g and, similarly, (19) . Thus, the maximum occurs for this case at M = K + D:
To prevent the bank from investing in the evaluated bad projects, it commands (0) (K + D), which, by substituting (19) for F 0 and noting F = R=q g , gives rise to (20) .
And ( 
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